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This first-rate treatment of explanation should help set the agenda for work in 
this area for years to come. 
Now to the inevitably more critical points. I will zero in on two concepts central 
to Strevens’s project: “causal entailment” and “cohesion”. I will try to raise problems 
for the first, and then suggest how they might be solved, by taking an approach 
different from his own to the second. 
Consider a well-known example: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
Circles represent “neurons”; arrows represent stimulatory channels; lines ending 
with dots represent inhibitory channels. Shading a circle indicates that the neuron 
fires. Temporal order is represented by reading from left to right. Bold capitals name 
neurons,  italicized  capitals  events  of  their  firing.  Here,  neurons  A  and  C  fire 
simultaneously (at time 0, say); C sends a stimulatory signal to D, causing it to fire (at 
time 1), while A sends a stimulatory signal to B. Since C also sends an inhibitory 
signal to B, B does not fire. Finally, D sends a stimulatory signal to E, causing it to 
fire (at time 2). Figure 2 shows what would have happened if C had not fired:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
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B AThis example is a nice test case for a philosophical account of explanation: an 
account ought to show that, and why, C is explanatorily relevant to E, whereas A is 
not.  
Suppose  you  favor  a  causal  approach  to  explanation.  As  Strevens  astutely 
explains, you face a choice. One path: you lean on some account of the metaphysics 
of causation, which you hope will demonstrate that C but not A is among the causes 
of E; you may then simply draw upon this result, saying that C is explanatorily 
relevant to E because it is among E’s causes, whereas A is not because it is not. 
Strevens  abjures  this  path,  preferring  an  alternative  that  assumes  little  about  the 
metaphysics of causation. The aim is then to develop a sophisticated story about how 
causal information gets packaged into explanatory information – which story, if all 
goes well, will provide the tools for distinguishing the explanatory relevance of A 
and C in cases like this. 
It is not that no purely metaphysical account of causation gets presupposed. The 
picture is rather this: The theory of explanation needs, as one of its raw ingredients, 
some  such  account.  (Strevens  considers  several  options,  remaining  neutral  among 
them.) But this account can be highly non-discriminating – so much so, perhaps, that it 
qualifies both A and C as causes of E. (In Strevens’s preferred terminology, both A 
and C may count as exerting causal influence on E.) Only after substantial processing 
and refinement that adds in certain other ingredients do we cook up the kind of 
sophisticated  causal-explanatory  concept  we  are  deploying  when  we  confidently 
assert that in figure 1, E fires because of C, and not because of A. 
Let’s plump for a specific account of the metaphysics of causation. (It’s one of 
the accounts Strevens treats as a live option.) We first need Strevens’s distinction 
between “concrete” and “high-level” events, which I will simplify as follows: take a 
“concrete” event to consist simply in the instantiation by some space-time region of 
some complete physical state. Stipulate that for any “high-level” event C, there is a set T 
of concrete events such that C occurs iff some member of T occurs. So concrete 
event C* is a realizer of high-level event C iff the claim that C* occurs entails the 
claim that C occurs.  
Now for the account of causal influence: C* causally influences E* just in case, 
for a suitably wide range of alternative concrete events to C*, had any one of those 
alternatives occurred in place of C*, some corresponding alternative to E* would 
have occurred in place of E*. Taking for granted that the alternatives to C* occur in 
the same region of space-time R1 that C* occupies, and similarly for E*’s region R2, 
here’s another formulation: the contents of R2 counterfactually co-vary to a suitably 
high degree with the contents of R1. We can leave it open what “suitably” comes to. 
A natural approach is that any amount of counterfactual covariation secures some causal influence of C* on E*, and that we measure the amount of influence by the 
extent of the covariation. These details will not matter. 
Where A* is a concrete realizer of A in figure 1, and E* a concrete realizer of E, 
our diagram leaves it unspecified whether A* causally influences E*. But it’s obvious 
that we can stipulate that this is so, without imperiling the intuitive verdict that C and 
not A causally explains E. Suppose that firing neurons emit radiation that has a 
substantial effect, not on whether any other neuron fires, but on how they do so, if they 
fire at all. Thanks to A’s firing, E fires in the color green; if A had not fired at all, the 
firing of E would have been red. Then not only does A* causally influence E*, but 
by any reasonable way of measuring degree of influence, its degree of influence will be 
considerable.  The  example  thus  shares  crucial  features  with  Strevens’s  Rasputin 
example, in which Rasputin dies by drowning only after the efforts of his assassins to 
poison  him  and  shoot  him  fail  to  kill  him.  Strevens  (p.  46)  correctly  uses  this 
example to establish that relations of causal influence are too crude to provide a basis 
for drawing the explanatory distinctions we need.  
So how do we show that in figure 1, C, and not A, is explanatorily relevant to E? 
By showing that C (more exactly: the claim that C occurs) is an essential part of at 
least one veridical causal model for E, whereas A is not. 
I do not think this can be done. 
A veridical model for some claim (e.g., the claim that E occurs) is a set of true 
sentences that entail that claim. Statement P is an essential part of some veridical 
model  for  statement  Q  iff  the  statements  in  the  model  aside  from  P  fail  to 
collectively entail Q. The trouble comes when we try to say what a causal model is. 
Here is Strevens’s first explanation:  
Finally, the model is causal because the statements in the model do not merely 
entail that e occurs; they causally entail e, meaning that the entailment of e, or more 
exactly the derivation of e, mirrors a part of the causal process by which e was 
produced. (pp. 71-2) 
This is no official definition; that comes later. Still, warning flags go up. There just is 
no such thing as the derivation of some claim from some other claims. Nor is it clear 
what  sort  of  independent  grip  we’re  meant  to  have  on  the  notion  of  “causal 
process”,  let  alone  the  notion  of  the  causal  process  by  which  some  event  was 
produced. Unfortunately, a look at the gory details doesn’t seem to help. 
A is certainly an essential part of a veridical model for E
1: let this model consist of 
sentences P1 – P4 stating that (i) A fires at time 0; (ii) the five neurons are connected 
                                                 
1 I’m sloppily eliding the difference between A, and a sentence stating that A 
occurs. as  shown;  (iii)  nothing  outside  the  five-neuron  network  is  happening  that  could 
interfere with how events within this network unfold; (iv) appropriate dynamical 
‘neuron laws’ connect the signals received by a neuron to its behavior, and determine 
how signals are transmitted along channels. P1 - P4 will entail that E fires at time 2, 
but P2 - P4 by themselves clearly will not.  
Is this veridical model a causal model – and, if not, for reasons that do not also 
spell trouble for the explanatory standing of C? 
Set aside two confused grounds for doubt. You might worry about the propriety 
of some or all of P1 - P4. Don’t: any decent veridical causal model that shows that C 
is explanatorily relevant to E will need P2 - P4, together with an exact analog of P1. 
You might worry that “the” derivation of E from this model won’t mirror the causal 
process by which E in fact comes about: don’t we show that E must fire by using a 
disjunctive syllogism, reasoning that if C fires, then (for such-and-such reasons) E 
will fire, and likewise that if C doesn’t fire, then (for such-and-such different reasons) 
E will still fire? Well, we could produce such a derivation. But this observation is 
doubly irrelevant: we don’t need to; and at any rate, what could possibly entitle us to 
assert, at this stage of the analysis, that such a derivation doesn’t mirror the causal 
process  by  which  E  is  brought  about?  If  we’d  already  produced  an  account  of 
“causal processes” sufficient to secure this verdict, we could go home. 
So let’s examine whether Strevens’s official account can rule out our model as 
non-causal. Here is one part of that account (extracted from p. 78): every way of making 
the premises concrete causally entails some way of making the conclusion concrete.  
Does our model have this feature? 
Suppose not. That will be for one of two reasons.  
First reason: Some way of making the premises concrete fails to entail (“causally” 
or otherwise) any way of making the conclusion concrete. But if that is what stands in 
the way of finding a veridical causal model that witnesses the explanatory relevance 
of A to E, then – given the symmetry in the relevant entailment relations – it is very 
hard to see why we won’t run into exactly the same trouble, when trying to find a 
veridical causal model that witnesses the explanatory relevance of C to E. So let’s set 
this worry aside. 
Second  reason:  Some  way  of  making  the  premises  concrete  entails  a  way  of 
making  the  conclusion  concrete,  but  fails  to  do  so  causally.  But  how  would  this 
happen, exactly? The way in question will replace our P1 with a premise stating that 
the state of the region R1 taken up by A is S1. It will replace P2 and P3 with a 
specification (perhaps partial) of the state of the rest of the world at the given time 
(say, that this state is Z). It will replace our ‘neuron laws’ with fundamental physical 
laws, or – better – with special-purpose consequences of them, that explicitly assert that if R1 is in state S1 at some time, and the rest of the world is in state Z at that 
time, then 2 units of time later R2 will be in state S2 – where this will count as a 
concrete realizer of E.  
Now look at what Strevens writes, in the preceding pages: 
Let  me  begin  at  the  bottom,  with  the  facts  about  causal  entailment  between 
concrete events.  
… 
A causal influence relation between events c and e exists just in case there exists a 
causal law connecting a property P of c and a property Q of e, a law having roughly 
the form If P(c) and Z then Q(e), for some set of background conditions Z.  
… 
I now define causal entailment in the obvious way: the derivation of the Q-hood of 
e from the P-hood of c is a causal entailment just in case it goes by way of modus 
ponens applied to a causal law (or consists of a chain of such deductions). (pp. 76-
77) 
The trouble is that the model we just detailed meets these requirements to the letter.  
Or does it? Maybe the laws included in this model – the laws that assert that if R1 
is in state S1 at some time, and the rest of the world is in state Z at that time, then 2 
units of time later R2 will be in state S2 – are not really causal laws: 
What is a causal law? … it is a logical consequence of the fundamental laws that 
satisfies a further condition whose content is dictated by the correct metaphysics of 
causal influence. … on the counterfactual view, the causal law must hold because, 
in the presence of Z, e’s Q-hood counterfactually depends on c’s P-hood. (p. 77) 
I cannot make full sense of this condition
2, but also cannot see how our laws fail to 
meet  it.  (Remember  that  we’ve  already  stipulated  that  the  actual  and  possible 
concrete realizers of A and C are alike in exerting substantial causal influence on the 
corresponding realizers of E.) 
This is the end of the line: the search for grounds to deny that A is an essential 
part  of  some  veridical  causal  model  for  E  have  turned  up  nothing  remotely 
conclusive.  No  great  surprise,  I  think:  if  we  help  ourselves  to  little  more  than 
entailment relations mediated by laws, we just cannot gain sufficient leverage to prise 
A and C apart. 
So we should look elsewhere. Where? An attractive option comes into view, if 
we consider Strevens’ important concept of “cohesion”, and how best to understand 
it. 
                                                 
2 Since it has already been stipulated that a causal law is a logical consequence of the 
fundamental laws, what does it mean to add that it holds “because” some relation of 
counterfactual dependence holds? Begin with Strevens’s extremely important insight about explanatory depth, and the 
way that one causal explanation can achieve more of it than another. Strevens ties this 
insight  to  his  preferred  account  of  explanations  as  provided  by  veridical  causal 
models, but this is not necessary. Let’s just assume that we’re working with some 
approach  to  explanation  that  sees  the  explanation  of  singular  events,  at  least,  as 
consisting in the provision of certain kinds of information about their causes. Now 
consider a simple example:  
A window has broken. Why? Because Suzy threw a rock at it. We could fill out 
that answer in many ways: we could trace the intermediate causes connecting Suzy’s 
throw to the breaking; we could trace her throw’s own causal origins; we could 
highlight the other causes contemporaneous with her throw with which it conspired 
in order to bring about the breaking. But Strevens brings out a distinct dimension 
along which our explanation of the breaking can be deepened: we could highlight 
those aspects of Suzy’s throw in virtue of which it was able to bring about the breaking, 
distinguishing  them  from  other  aspects  that  were  explanatorily  irrelevant.  For 
example, the mass of her rock was important, but its color, not so much. And we 
could  go  further  still,  articulating,  even  with  some  mathematical  precision,  the 
structure of the way in which the window’s breaking depended upon such factors as 
the rock’s mass, the angle and velocity of the throw, and the distance between Suzy 
and the window.  
How do we capture, in general, this sort of depth-producing information? For 
Strevens, we do so by starting with a highly specific veridical causal model of our 
explanandum, and abstracting away details by means of a certain procedure. Myself, I 
prefer to think about this issue counterfactually: very roughly, we achieve depth by 
showing  how  to  distinguish  those  counterfactual  variations  on  Suzy’s  throw  that 
would  and  wouldn’t  still  lead  to  the  window’s  breaking.  But  this  difference  of 
emphasis is minor. The key point is that, one way or another, we show how to 
situate the details of what actually happens within a suitably chosen range of possible 
alternatives. 
The qualifier “suitably chosen” is essential. It’s helpful – deepening – to note that 
the window would still have broken had the rock been a different color, and not if it 
had been sufficiently less massive. It’s not helpful to note that the window still would 
have broken if, instead of throwing a rock, Suzy had set off a bomb. For that matter, 
it’s not helpful to note that it still would have shattered if she had thrown so hard 
that the rock, while missing the window, broke the sound barrier, with the resulting 
sonic boom doing the work. Somehow, we are able distinguish relevant from irrelevant 
alternatives within which to situate the actual scenario. Strevens: what distinguishes these relevant alternatives as such as that, taken together, they form a cohesive set. The 
question is how to understand “cohesion”. 
One preliminary point: the right notion of “cohesion” needs to operate at the level 
of causal processes themselves, and not just at the level of their “inputs”. Consider two 
scenarios, each of which begins with the launching of a projectile and ends with a 
window shattering. The scenarios differ only slightly in the manner of the launch. 
But they differ just enough so that in one case, the window shatters because the 
projectile strikes it; whereas in the other case, it shatters because the projectile breaks 
the sound barrier. These should count as substantially different ways of bringing about 
a shattering. But you won’t see that, if you look for the differences just in the initial 
conditions.  
I follow Strevens in thinking that we are operating with some crucial notion of 
similarity here. Go back to the example of Suzy breaking the window. We collect 
together the actual scenario with alternative scenarios in which the window shatters 
as a result of closely similar processes. We achieve explanatory depth, concerning the 
question why the window shatters, by clearly articulating the features that all of these 
scenarios share in common, that serve to distinguish them from alternatives in which 
the window does not shatter. So the philosophical task is now to explain the nature 
and origin of the needed standards of similarity. 
The  only  alternative  Strevens  takes  seriously  also  strikes  me  as  hopelessly 
optimistic: “Differences between causal elements are perhaps to be discerned at the 
level of fundamental physics.” (p. 104) Where else to look? Not to metaphysics: I 
agree  with  Strevens  about  that.  But  another  option  can  be  discerned  in  the 
“unificationist” strand in our concept of understanding. The key idea is this: part of 
what we are after in explanation is the acquisition of a cognitively effective means for 
organizing our information about the world.  
This desideratum is most visible in mathematics. In lieu of a proper theory, let 
me offer a somewhat silly but nicely illustrative example. 
Consider  the  following  initial  segment  of  an  infinite  sequence  of  natural 
numbers: 
1,1,1,2,3,2,1,3,5,4,2,5,7,8,3,7,9,16,5,11,11,32,8,13,13,64,13,17,… 
Perhaps you find this sequence confusing. You don’t understand it. You don’t 
know why it has the form it does. If so, the following way of reorganizing the initial 
segment will make things crystal clear: 
1,  1,  1,  2, 
3,  2,  1,  3, 
5,  4,  2,  5, 
7,  8,  3,  7, 9,  16, 5,  11, 
11, 32, 8,  13, 
13, 64, 13, 17,… 
Looking down the columns, we four simple, familiar sequences. Once you see 
this,  you  understand  the  original  sequence.  But  not  by  acquiring  a  special  sort  of 
information about it.  
We can’t seriously doubt that this desideratum operates in empirical inquiry, as 
well.  That  leads  to  a  suggestion:  perhaps  the  “similarity  metrics”  by  which  we 
organize our view of causal processes in a given domain – and thereby come to see 
certain sets of them as more cohesive than others – earn their privileged status because 
of the way they contribute to the effective organization of causal knowledge. In a tiny 
bit  more  detail:  What  scheme  for  taxonomizing  causal  processes,  and  capturing 
relations of similarity among them, best lends itself to the articulation of a set of 
widely-instantiated,  informative,  and  unified  causal  generalizations  in  a  given 
domain? That’s the scheme that will ground the judgments of similarity that in turn 
underwrite the standards of “explanatory depth” that Strevens has drawn attention 
to. If this approach to “cohesion” is correct, then a key piece of unfinished business 
is to construct a proper theory of the effective organization of causal information. 
Suppose we have such a theory in hand. In light of it, we can see that, in a certain 
domain, a certain way of taxonomizing causal processes into types, and imposing a 
similarity metric on these processes, is best, given the aim of effective organization of 
causal information. Then a solution to the stubborn problems posed by cases of 
preemption  (e.g.,  figure  1)  may  drop  out.  Why  does  C,  in  figure  1,  count  as 
explanatorily relevant to E, whereas A does not? Because there is a sequence of 
events connecting C to E that counts not merely as a chain of causal influence – such 
can easily be found, connecting A to E, as well – but counts as a process closely similar 
to a wide range of other such processes, both actual and possible, connecting firings 
of  neurons  to  one  another.  If  so,  then  the  proper  order  of  development  of  a 
philosophical theory of explanation is not quite the one Strevens follows: while we 
should  agree  that  the  ultimate  metaphysical  ingredients  are  minimalist,  we  should 
“process”  them  by  first  developing  the  theory  of  causal  taxonomies  and  causal 
similarity  metrics,  and  then  showing  how  distinctions  of  explanatory  relevance 
between  causes  and  preempted  backups  fall  out.  And  it  is  Strevens’s  notion  of 
“depth” that should serve as the touchstone for such a philosophical account of 
causal taxonomy and similarity. 
 
 